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THE NEW GENETIC AGE: DO OUR GENES MAKE US
DISABLED INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT?
MARK S. DICHTER*
SARAH E. SUTOR**
I. INTRODUCTION
B REAKTHROUGHS in genetic research have created new op-
portunities for preventing and curing diseases once thought to
be incurable.1 Research in the area of genetics has led to new op-
portunities for preventing a myriad of health problems, 2 including
* Partner, Labor and Employment Section, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.S.E.E., 1996, Drexel University; J.D., 1969, Villanova
University School of Law.
** Associate, Labor and Employment Section, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A., with honors, 1992, Pennsylvania State University;
J.D., 1995, Villanova University School of Law.
1. See Mark A. Rothstein, The Use of Genetic Information for Nonmedical Purposes,
9 J.L. & HEALTH 109, 109 (1994-95). Rothstein states that the results of genetic
research will "promis[e] to improve the quality of life and giv[e] hope that even
some of the most dreaded diseases can be cured." Id.; see Richard A. Bornstein,
Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation: A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4
J.L. & POL'Y 551, 610 n.3 (1996) (stating that "advances in the mapping of human
genes will eventually mean that people could obtain a 'genetic passport' which
would tell them what diseases they would likely suffer from in the f[ut]ure [sic]")
(citations omitted); see also Research Pointing the Way Forward in Asthma Prevention,
PutLSE, Jan. 27, 1996, at 30 ("[G]enetic research is promising to revolutionize the
treatment of certain diseases."); Michael Setz, Financing Small Business: Financing is
Increasing for Genetic-Information Firms, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1996, at B2 (discussing
United States genetic research project as "leading 'to models of how to prevent
certain diseases the drug companies haven't been able to prevent or treat'").
2. See Gail Dutton, If the Genes Fit... Genetic Testing and Employers and Insurance
Firms, MGMT. REv., Oct. 1995, at 25, 26 (identifying five main areas in which ge-
netic testing is used: (1) carrier screening: used to determine whether "one is
likely to pass on genetic diseases to offspring;" (2) prenatal diagnostic testing: used
to determine "whether a fetus carries a disease-causing gene;" (3) predisposition
testing: used to determine "one's susceptibility to certain diseases;" (4) confirma-
tory diagnostic testing: "confirms the presence of a suspected genetic disease;"
and (5) forensic and identity testing: used to "determine paternity and criminal
identification").
(613)
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cystic fibrosis, 3 breast cancer 4 and lung disease.5 The Human Gen-
ome Project, an international fifteen year research effort, is cur-
rently attempting to map and sequence all of the human genome,
including approximately 100,000 human genes.6 Although genetic
research serves to improve all areas of medicine, including diagno-
sis, reproductive planning, disease prevention, treatment and re-
search, the nonmedical uses of genetic research have caused some
commentators to question whether the use of genetic information
has the practical effect of harming those persons the research is
attempting to benefit.7
3. See generally Elizabeth J. Thomson, Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of the
Human Cenome Project, 3 DICK.J. ENvrL. L. & PoL'v 55 (1994) (discussing impact of
genetic research on determination of carrier gene for cystic fibrosis and potential
impact this information, if disclosed, could have on employment and insurance
coverage). Currently, genetic technology is being used to identify those individu-
als who carry a cystic fibrosis mutation, a common recessive genetic disorder in
which one of every 25 caucasians carry a mutation. See id. at 60. Since the discov-
ery of the cystic fibrosis gene, researchers have discovered over 350 different muta-
tions of the gene. See id.
4. See id. Mapping of a gene on chromosome 17 (BRCA1) has shown a muta-
tion that predisposes some women to breast cancer. See id. The mutation is esti-
mated to be present in one of every 200 women. See id. Those with the mutation
have an 85% chance of developing breast cancer sometime in their lives. See id.
5. See id. Genetic research has led to the discovery of alpha 1 antitrypsin defi-
ciency. See id. This enzyme deficiency can result in severe lung and liver disease,
especially when exposed to smoke, alcohol or other toxins. See id.
6. See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 109. After mapping and sequencing the en-
tire human genome, the second goal of the Human Genome Project is to "make
and sequence a number of model organisms" to "provide a model for the study of
some human genetic disorders." Thompson, supra note 3, at 57. The third goal is
the "development of computerized data collection, storage and handling." Id.
The fourth goal of the project is "related to the ethical, legal and social issues" of
genetic research. Id. The fifth goal is "to provide research, training, and to de-
velop a cadre of researchers who are trained in the area of genome and genetic
sciences." Id. Finally, the sixth goal is "technology development and transfer." Id.
7. See Bornstein, supra note 1, at 551-52 ("While genetic tests can be extremely
helpful in preventing disease, they can also prevent many people from obtaining
medical insurance ... if genetic test results reveal a propensity for illness .... [A]
number of institutions ... have discriminated on a genetic basis."); Paul F. Ger-
hart, Employee Privacy Rights in the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 175, 195 (1995)
(discussing physical examinations as mandated by employer as possibly being in-
clusive of genetic test results and stating that use of such results to deny employ-
ment is illegal discrimination); Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic
Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L.
Rv. 369, 371 (1994) (discussing dangers of employment decisions being weighted
by genetic tests that indicate potential for future health problems). See generally
Symposium, Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Human Genome Project, 29 Hous. L.
REv. 7, 8-10 (1992) (discussing impact Human Genome Project may have on equal-
ity of opportunity, conceptions of human responsibility and normality); Sympo-
sium, The Human Genome Initiative and the Impact of Genetic Screening and Technologies,
17 AM.J.L. & MED. 7 (1991) (discussing practical implications of genetic testing on
individuals).
614
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In particular, there is concern that genetic information will be
impermissibly used by insurers and employers to exclude from cov-
erage or employment those deemed by their genetic makeup as a
higher risk for disease.8 Although many permissible uses of ge-
netic information by employers exist, such as optional lead testing
for women planning pregnancies and optional testing for ultravio-
let (UV) exposure, the concern surrounding genetic discrimina-
8. See Bornstein, supra note 1, at 552-53. Bornstein states:
[A] number of institutions, including health and life insurers, have dis-
criminated on a genetic basis. People at risk for genetic discrimination
include individuals who carry a gene that increases the probability that
they will develop a disease but who are currently asymptomatic; individu-
als who are carriers for certain genetic conditions but who will remain
asymptomatic; individuals who have genetic polymorphisms that are not
known to cause disease; and relatives of individuals with known or pre-
sumed genetic characteristics.
Id. at 552-53.
1997]
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tion has led to state9 and federal' legislation that restricts genetic
9. For a comprehensive analysis of state legislation in the area of genetic test-
ing, see id. at 589-606. At present, at least 12 states have enacted legislation that
restricts genetic testing or use of genetic information in insurance practice. See id.
at 553; see also Amiz. REv. STAT. § 20-448 (1990 & Supp. 1995) ("No insurer shall
refuse to consider an application for life or disability insurance on the basis of a
genetic condition."); CAL. CIv. CODE § 56.17 (West Supp. 1996) (providing sanc-
tions for any person who wilfully or negligently discloses results of genetic testing
to third party); id. § 1374.7 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996) ("No plan shall refuse to
enroll any person or accept any person as a subscriber or renew any person as a
subscriber after appropriate application on the basis of a person's genetic charac-
teristics that may ... be associated with disability in that person or that person's
offspring."); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETv CODE § 1374.9 (West Supp. 1996) (providing
sanctions for violations of section 1374.7 of the California Civil Code); id.
§§ 10123.3, 10140 ("No self-insured employee-welfare benefit plan shall refuse to
enroll any person or accept person as subscriber or renew any person as a sub-
scriber after appropriate application on the basis of that person's genetic charac-
teristics that may... be associated with disability in that person or that person's
offspring."); id. § 10143 ("No insurance company licensed in this state shall refuse
to issue or sell or renew any new policy of life or disability insurance after appropri-
ate application solely by reason of the fact that the person to be insured carries a
gene which may ... be associated with disability in that person's offspring."); id.§ 11512.95 (stating same as applied to nonprofit hospital service program); id.
§§ 10123.31, .35, 10140.1, .5, 10146-49, 10149.1, 11512.96, .965 (providing penal-
ties for violations of civil code); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1994) (providing
comprehensive legislative declaration of genetic information as property of indi-
vidual to whom it pertains and protection of such information); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 760.40 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that except under specified circumstances,
"DNA analysis may be performed only with the informed consent of the person to
be tested, and the results of such DNA analysis, whether held by a public or private
entity, are the exclusive property of the person tested"); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-54-1
to -8 (Supp. 1995) (same); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 223.1 (1994) (same); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting health plan company from
requiring or making inquiries into genetic testing of applicant in determining eli-
gibility for scope of coverage or amount of premium); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-
206 (1995) ("An insurer may not refuse to consider an application for life or disa-
bility insurance on the basis of a genetic condition, developmental delay, or devel-
opmental disability."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-H:2 to -H:5 (Supp. 1995)
(prohibiting requests and requirements of genetic testing within parameters of
employment and health insurance); OHiO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.42, .43,
3901.49, .491, .50, .501 (Anderson Supp. 1995) (prohibiting health maintenance
organizations from considering any information obtained from genetic screening
in manner adverse to applicant); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 659.700, .705, .710, .715, .720,
746.135 (1995) (stating that one's genetic information is property of individual
that may only be obtained through informed consent); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.89
(West 1995) (stating that insurer, or county, city, village or school board that pro-
vides health care services may not require or request one to get genetic test or
require or request any information from such test previously performed).
10. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (prohibiting insurance companies from using
genetic information as preexisting condition without diagnosis of condition re-
lated to genetic information). This newly enacted legislation, designed to "im-
prove portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and
individual markets" and to "improve access to long-term care services and cover-
age," specifically addresses the use of genetic information for insurance purposes.
Id. preamble. For example, section 701 of the Act prohibits insurance companies
from using genetic information as a preexisting condition, absent a diagnosis of
4
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testing or the use of genetic information by insurers, including em-
ployers that are self-insured."1 In addition, the potential for dis-
crimination by employers has led some commentators to believe
that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 2 should be inter-
preted to protect against discrimination based on genetic
information. 13
the condition relating to the genetic condition: "TREATMENT OF GENETIC IN-
FORMATION.-Genetic information shall not be treated as a condition described
in subsection (a) (1) in the absence of a diagnosis of the condition related to such
information." Id. § 701(b) (1) (B). Section 701(a) (1) provides:
[A] group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group
health insurance coverage, may, with respect to a participant or benefici-
ary, impose a pre-existing condition exclusion only if: (1) such exclusion
relates to a condition (whether physical or mental), regardless of the
cause of the condition, for which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treat-
ment was recommended or received within the 6 month period ending
on the enrollment date.
Id. § 701 (a) (1).
Similarly, section 702 of the Act prohibits discrimination against individual
participants and beneficiaries based on health status, particularly genetic
information:
[A] group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering group
health insurance coverage in connection with a group health plan, may
not establish rules for eligibility (including continued eligibility) of any
individual to enroll under the terms of the plan based on any of the fol-
lowing health status-related factors in relation to the individual or a de-
pendent of the individual:
(F) Genetic information.
Id. § 702(a)(1).
The definition of "group health plan" is broadly defined so as to include self-
insured employers:
(a) GROUP HEALTH PLAN.-For purposes of this part-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The term 'group health plan' means an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan to the extent that the plan provides medi-
cal care (as defined in paragraph (2) and including items and
services paid for as medical care) to employees or their dependents
(as defined under the terms of the plan) directly or through insur-
ance, reimbursement, or otherwise.
Id. § 706(a) (1).
11. See Dutton, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 makes it unlawful to knowingly expose fertile women to lead, thus leading
commentators to believe that employers should inform employees of mutagenic
properties of lead and provide for optional testing, explaining that employers
should offer testing to persons who lack pigmentation because they may be more
susceptible to UV light, and also commenting that employers should not mandate
testing, or make hiring decisions based upon test results). Although beyond the
scope of this Article, genetic testing in the workplace can be properly and responsibly
used in two cases: (1) "to place individuals to avoid occupational illnesses" and (2)
'to assess chromosomal damage after exposure." Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
13. See, e.g., Miller & Huvos, supra note 7, at 375 (arguing for expansive read-
ing of ADA to encompass asymptomatic individuals who possess certain genetic
information). Miller and Huvos state:
1997] 617
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This Article addresses whether the definition of disability
under the ADA should encompass asymptomatic individuals with
knowledge of their genetic makeup. In particular, this Article ana-
lyzes the legislative intent of the ADA and applicable statutory pro-
visions and regulations to determine if the ADA currently
contemplates coverage for such individuals. 14 This Article con-
cludes by stating that although justifiable reasons may exist to af-
ford asymptomatic individuals with genetic information protection
under the ADA, courts should exercise caution before unduly
broadening the ADA's protection where recent federal and state
legislation provide sufficient redress against potential genetic infor-
mation discrimination in the workplace. 15
II. THE ADA: WHO WAS IT INTENDED TO PROTECT?
Enacted in 1990, the ADA was designed to protect a "discrete
and insular minority" who "as a group . . .are severely disadvan-
taged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally."16 As
the congressional findings reflect, Congress intended to protect
those individuals who are:
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
A genetic anomaly is arguably a physiological disorder with potential for
affecting one or more of several body systems. Furthermore, while the
ADA specifically excludes certain arguably genetic conditions, such as ho-
mosexuality and kleptomania, from the definition of disability, it does not
exclude genetic conditions generally. Thus, one could maintain, if Con-
gress had intended categorically to exclude genetic conditions from char-
acterization as disabilities, it likely would have said so in the legislation.
However, even under the assumption that EEOC pronouncements to the
contrary are correct, the door to ADA protection for genetic abnormali-
ties still remains open for other reasons.
Id. at 375. For other commentary on whether the ADA should prohibit discrimina-
tion based on genetic information, see generally Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimina-
tion: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and
Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 109 (1991) ("[T]he Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), may not sufficiently protect employees and insureds from genetic dis-
crimination .... 'Genetic technologies' advent necessitates efforts to rectify state
and federal statutory coverage gaps, strictly regulate employers and produce com-
prehensive guidelines regarding its use."); Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Genetic Defect
Is a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Preventing Genetic Discrimination
by Employers, 1 ANNALs HEALTH L. 107, 116-17 (1992) (proposing National Genetic
Anti-Discrimination Act to rectify shortcomings of ADA within parameters of ge-
netic testing).
14. For a discussion of applicable statutory provisions, regulations and legisla-
tive history of the ADA, see infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of why the definition of disability under the ADA
should not be expanded, see infra notes 41-81 and accompanying text.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (6), (7).
618 [Vol. 42: p. 613
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position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individ-
uals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society. 17
At the time Congress enacted the ADA, it was estimated that
approximately 43,000,000 Americans had one or more physical or
mental disabilities. 18  Congress estimated that this number would
increase as the population lives longer and experiences the disa-
bling effects of aging. 19  As this number clearly reflects, Congress
referenced only those presently disabled, and not the millions of
other asymptomatic individuals who only have knowledge of their
genetic information and may never manifest symptoms. 20 There-
fore, the question is whether the ADA's definition of disability
should now be interpreted to cover additional individuals that pos-
sess only genetic information and are, for all intents and purposes,
asymptomatic.
III. DEFINING DISABILITY
Under the ADA, disability is defined as: "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the ma-
jor life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."21
This Part addresses whether there is support for coverage of indi-
viduals with genetic information under the alternative definitions
of disability under the ADA.
17. Id.
18. See id. § 12101 (a) (1) ("[S]ome 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a
whole is growing older.").
19. See id.
20. See Reginald Rhein, Federal Disability Law Bans Genetic Discrimination, Bj-
OTECH. NEWSWATCH, May 1, 1995, at 1 (citing to at least one geneticist who has
concerns about whether ADA is appropriate forum for addressing discrimination
based on genetic information). As Paul R. Billings, a geneticist at the veterans
hospital in Palo Alto, stated:
The ADA was constructed for people with basically phenotypic disabilities
who had a long history of discrimination, and to redress that problem
.... We are now diluting those people's interests with a large number of
people who conceivably will argue that they are being perceived of as
disabled even though they only have a gene for colon cancer, breast can-
cer, or Alzheimer's dementia, whatever the gene of the week is.
Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A)-(C).
1997]
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A. A Physical or Mental Impairment That Substantially Limits One or
More Major Life Activities
Whether an individual's genetic information constitutes a disa-
bility under this first definitional standard is not directly addressed
in the statute, regulations or legislative history.22 ADA Regulations
and Interpretive Guidance promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ("Interpretive Guidance"), how-
ever, have indirectly tackled the issue. 23 For example, the ADA reg-
ulations state that a "characteristic predisposition to illness or
disease" is not an impairment, and therefore, cannot be considered
a disability under the ADA.24 EEOC guidance elaborates by stating:
"A person may be predisposed to developing an illness or a disease
because of factors such as environmental, economic, cultural, or
social conditions. This predisposition does not amount to an
impairment."25
Assuming, arguendo, that genetic information constitutes an
impairment under the ADA's first definition of disability, an asymp-
tomatic individual obviously does not possess an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.26 Substantially limiting impair-
ments are impairments presently occurring, rather than those that
may or may not occur in someone's lifetime.27 The requirement of
a present impairment becomes clear when one considers the fac-
22. But see [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 6888
[hereinafter EEOC Compl. Man.]. The EEOC addressed the issue of genetic infor-
mation in the context of the third definitional requirement, regarded as having a
"substantially limiting impairment." Id. For a further discussion of the issue of
genetic information in the context of "being regarded as having a substantially
limiting impairment," see infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
23. EEOC guidelines are entitled to deference by courts. See General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140 (1976). The guidelines, however, do not have the
force of law, and some courts have refused to follow them. See, e.g., Deckert v. City
of Ulysses, No. 93-1295, 1995 WL 580074, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 1995) (holding
that when ADA creates specific method through which court is to determine exist-
ence of disability, EEOC guideline creating "checklist" of approved disabilities is
invalid); Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Or. 1994) (stating that
to extent there is any inconsistency between EEOC Technical Assistance Manual
and ADA, it must be resolved in favor of ADA); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F.
Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (rejecting EEOC guideline that made insulin-
dependent diabetes disability per se as contrary to ADA).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. 11 (1997).
25. EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 22, 6882.
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Major life activities are defined as "caring for one-
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, and working." Id.
27. See id. § 1630.2(j) (defining substantially limits). "Substantially limits" is
defined as:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
620 [Vol. 42: p. 613
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tors used to determine a substantially limiting impairment. The In-
terpretive Guidance lists three factors that are utilized to determine
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(1) "the nature and severity of the impairment;" (2) "the duration
or expected duration of the impairment; and" (3) "the permanent
or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term im-
pact of or resulting from the impairment. '28 Put simply, these fac-
tors do not lend themselves to an analysis of whether asymptomatic
individuals are substantially limited in any major life activity by their
genetic information. For example, it is impossible to predict the
"nature and severity" of an individual's genetic makeup if the per-
son does not know whether he or she will ever manifest symptoms.
Likewise, how does one determine the "duration or expected dura-
tion of an impairment" that may never exist? The inherent imprac-
ticality in applying these factors leads to the inescapable conclusion
that a person's genetic information does not constitute a disability
under the first prong of the ADA.
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the aver-
age person in the general population can perform that same major life
activity.
Id.
28. .d. § 1630.20)(2). In addition, the regulations also define "substantially
limited" with respect to the major life activity of working:
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the abil-
ity to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j) (2) of this section,
the following factors may be considered in determining whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable
access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area,
from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impair-
ment (class ofjobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utiliz-
ing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geo-
graphical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because
of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
Id. § 1630.20) (3).
1997]
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B. A Record of Such an Impairment
The regulations define a record of impairment as "a history of,
or [a] misclassif [ication] as having, a mental or physical impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29
This portion of the ADA's definition of a disability does not support
the conclusion that genetic information can constitute a disability
for two reasons. First, this part of the ADA's definition of a disabil-
ity is designed to protect those who have a history of an impairment
(such as cancer or heart disease). Asymptomatic individuals do
not, however, fall within this category of individuals. 30 Second, this
definition of a disability under the ADA hinges on the underlying
impairment constituting a disability under the ADA. Asymptomatic
individuals do not, however, have an underlying impairment that,
at one time, manifested itself, constituting a disability under the
ADA.31
C. Regarded as Having Such an Impairment
If one were to argue that genetic information constitutes a dis-
ability under the ADA, one would no doubt maintain that it falls
into the ADA's third prong of the definition of a disability: "re-
garded as having such an impairment."32 Under the third prong,
an employee does not have to have a substantially limiting impair-
29. Id. § 1630.2(k).
30. See id. § 36.104. The regulations provide:
This test is intended to cover those who have a record of an impairment.
As explained in paragraph (3) of the rule's definition of disability, this
includes a person who has a history of an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity, such as someone who has recovered from an
impairment. It also includes persons who have been misclassified as hav-
ing an impairment.
This provision is included in the definition in part to protect individ-
uals who have recovered from a physical or mental impairment that previ-
ously substantially limited them in a major life activity. Discrimination on
the basis of such a past impairment is prohibited. Frequently occurring
examples of the first group (those who have a history of an impairment)
are persons with histories of mental or emotional illness, heart disease, or
cancer; examples of the second group (those who have been misclassified
as having an impairment) are persons who have been misclassified as hav-
ing mental retardation or mental illness.
Id.
31. For a discussion of what constitutes "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities," see supra notes 22-28 and
accompanying text.
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). The regulations define "regarded as" applying
to a person who:
(1) Has a physical or mental.impairment that does not substantially limit
major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such
limitation;
[Vol. 42: p. 613
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ment, provided that an employer regards the applicant or em-
ployee as having a disability. 33 An asymptomatic individual with a
genetic abnormality obviously fits comfortably within this definition
because no disabling symptoms have yet manifested. As a result of
the person's asymptomatic state, an employer could incorrectly per-
ceive or regard an individual with a genetic abnormality as being
substantially limited in some regard.
In addition, the Interpretive Guidance lends further support
for the proposition that genetic information is appropriately ad-
dressed under the "regarded as" definitional prong.3 4 The Inter-
pretive Guidance explains:
This part of the definition of "disability" applies to individ-
uals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of
genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other dis-
orders. Covered entities that discriminate against such in-
dividuals on the basis of such genetic information are
regarding the individuals as having impairments that sub-
stantially limit a major life activity. Those individuals,
therefore, are covered by the third part of the definition
of "disability. '35
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impair-
ment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h) (1) or (2) of
this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially
limiting impairment.
Id.
33. See Miller & Huvos, supra note 7, at 377 (stating that definition of re-
garded as "stands out as having the most far-reaching potential because of its sub-
jectivity"). Although Miller and Huvos argue in favor of using this definition
because of its "subjectivity," it is this subjectivity that creates potential for abuse by
litigants. For a discussion of the impact on litigation that inclusion of asymptom-
atic individuals under the "regarded as" prong would have, see infra notes 41-78
and accompanying text.
34. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 22, 6884 ("Because it is the em-
ployer's perception that is at issue, it is not necessary that the individual alleging
discrimination actually have a disability or an impairment.").
35. Id. The EEOC guidance also provides an example:
CP's genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to colon cancer.
CP is currently asymptomatic and may never in fact develop colon cancer.
After making CP a conditional offer of employment, R learns about CP's
increased susceptibility to colon cancer. R then withdraws the job offer
because of concerns about matters such as CP's productivity, insurance
costs, and attendance. R is treating CP as having an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, CP is covered by the
third part of the definition of "disability."
1997] 623
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Although courts are not obligated to follow the Interpretive Gui-
dance, the EEOC would no doubt pursue an administrative charge
based on allegations of genetic information discrimination, and
therefore, the Interpretive Guidance provides an important factor
in determining whether genetic information should be covered
under the ADA.
3 6
36. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (noting that
EEOC's interpretation is not controlling on courts but does constitute body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts may properly resort for gui-
dance). Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning. See, e.g., Gile
v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996) (relying on review of ADA,
its regulations and EEOC's interpretive guidance on issue); Webb v. Garelick Mfg.
Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1996) (deferring to EEOC's interpretive guidance
on ADA and applying EEOC's broad definition of "substantial limitation"); McKin-
ney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is true that we owe defer-
ence to the EEOC interpretation of [Title VII]."); Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950
F. Supp. 1420, 1435 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (concluding that EEOC's interpretive regu-
lations on ADA are entitled to substantial deference). Furthermore, compliance
with EEOC interpretation is warranted in light of the fact that Congress charged
the EEOC with providing technical assistance "regarding the laws and regulations
enforced by the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(j) (1994). Section 2000e-4(j)
provides in pertinent part:
Technical Assistance Training Institute
(1) The Commission shall establish a Technical Assistance Training Insti-
tute, through which the Commission shall provide technical assistance
and training regarding the laws and regulations enforced by the
Commission.
(2) An employer or other entity covered under this title.., shall not be
excused from compliance with the requirements of this title ... because
of any failure to receive technical assistance under this subsection.
Id.
As noted in the text, the EEOC's interpretation of a given statute is also indic-
ative of how the EEOC will pursue an administrative charge. For a discussion of
the EEOC's administrative process, see LEE M. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINA-
TION LAw § 2:3 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing administrative process for charges of un-
lawful employment practices). For example, in Title VII and ADA cases, charges of
discriminatory practices may be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the al-
leged discrimination occurred, by or on behalf of a person claiming to be ag-
grieved, or by a member of the EEOC. See id. The EEOC's investigative purpose is
to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge of dis-
crimination is true. See 1 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW &
LITIGATION at 12-29 (1996) (discussing EEOC administrative process). "'Reason-
able cause' means that the charge has sufficient merit to warrant litigation if the
matter is not resolved." Id. The investigator is given substantial authority to obtain
information. See id. at 13 (noting that investigator may require employees to fur-
nish testimony under oath or affirmation). If the EEOC determines after its inves-
tigation that there is not reasonable cause, it must dismiss the charge and promptly
notify the charging party and respondent of its action. See MODJESKA, supra, § 2:0
(discussing reasonable cause determinations). If the EEOC determines that there
is reasonable cause, then the EEOC must attempt to conciliate the matter. See
ROSSEIN, supra, at 12 (noting that EEOC attempts to assist charging parties and
respondents in negotiating settlement). If attempts at conciliation fail, the EEOC
may initiate a de novo civil action in federal district court, or in the alternative,
may issue a right-to-sue notice to the aggrieved individual, who may then bring his
[Vol. 42: p. 613
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In addition to the Interpretive Guidance, there are also at least
two references in the legislative history of the ADA that support the
argument that use of genetic information to make employment de-
cisions could fall within the "regarded as" definitional prong of dis-
ability.3 7 In particular, some members of Congress expressed
concern that those persons who suffered discrimination as a result
of sickle cell screening programs in the 1970s3 8 have some measure
of protection under the ADA.39 Aside from these brief remarks,
or her own civil action. See ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DIsCIuMINA-
TION LAw § 6.10 (3d ed. 1996).
37. See 136 CONG. REc. H4627 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Waxman). Representative Waxman cosponsored H.R. 2273, the House version of
the ADA, which was rejected when S. 933 became the version signed into law.
Representative Waxman explained how persons with genetic information would be
covered under the ADA:
I should not[e] that the employment protections of the ADA will be im-
portant, as well, for people who are identified through new genetic tests
as being carriers of a disease-associated gene. As has been noted through-
out the legislative process on this bill, a person who is regarded as having
an impairment which substantially limits a major life activity is covered
under this bill. Thus, an individual who is discriminated against, for ex-
ample, in employment, on the basis of being a carrier of a disease-associ-
ated gene, would be covered under this third prong of the definition.
Under the ADA, a carrier of disease-associated gene is protected in
employment as long as such individual is qualified for the job in question.
The determination as to whether a person is qualified must be made,
however, at the time of the particular employment decision-of hiring,
firing, promotion, and so forth-and may not be based on speculation
and predictions regarding the person's ability to be qualified for the job
in the future.
Id.
38. See Dutton, supra note 2, at 25 (discussing congressional concern that
sickle cell screening programs resulted in discrimination). Although employers
may not have had bad intentions in implementing tests for sickle cell anemia, poor
implementation of such programs can cause problems. See id. For example, the
DuPont Company, in Wilmington, Delaware once offered tests for sickle cell ane-
mia. See id. At first, employees and new hires had the option of refusing the test,
which caused concern about coercion that received unwanted publicity. See id. Du-
Pont ultimately changed the benefit so that employees had the option of volun-
teering and requesting the test, rather than refusing it. See id. As Dutton
remarked, "the difference was subtle, but important." Id.
39. See 136 CONG. REc. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Owens) (stating that protections of ADA should be made applicable to individuals
discriminated against due to results of genetic testing). Representative Owens co-
sponsored H.R. 2273, the House version of the ADA and served as a member of
the Conference Committee that amended S. 933, the version which became the
ADA. Reflecting on past discrimination related to sickle cell testing, Representa-
tive Owens surmised:
These protections of the ADA will also benefit individuals who are identi-
fied through genetic tests as being carriers of a disease-associated gene.
There is a record of genetic discrimination against such individuals, most
recently during sickle-cell screening programs in the 1970s. With the ad-
vent of new forms of genetic testing, it is even more critical that the pro-
tections of the ADA be in place. Under the ADA, such individuals may
1997]
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however, there is little else that concerns genetic information dis-
crimination in the legislative history of the ADA. In fact, Congress's
limited discussion of the subject has led more than one commenta-
tor to remark that Congress overlooked or disregarded the issue of
genetic information discrimination in its drafting of the ADA.40
Therefore, although the EEOC appears to support the proposition
that genetic information is included within the "regarded as" prong
of the definition of disability, the legislative history is inconclusive
on the issue.
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF INCLUSION
Although there seems to be some support for including ge-
netic information as a "regarded as" disability, the fact that an
asymptomatic individual with access to genetic information could
claim a disability under the ADA creates the potential for millions
of new persons to join the protected class of disabled individuals
under the ADA. Although protection is certainly needed for those
that are in fact discriminated against based on their genetic condi-
tion, courts should proceed with caution in determining whether a
person with genetic information is disabled under the ADA, given
the potential for millions of individuals to have standing under the
ADA.4
1
not be discriminated against simply because they may not be qualified for
ajob sometime in the future.... Moreover, such individuals may not be
discriminated against because they or their children might incur in-
creased health care costs for the employer.
Id.
40. See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton, The Dispersion of Genetic Technologies and the
Law, HASTINGS CENTER REP. May 1, 1995, at 13, 14 ("In drafting the ADA, Congress
said very little about genetic testing, an oversight that seems almost stunning
now.").
41. For example, by including asymptomatic individuals with genetic abnor-
malities in the protected class under the ADA, an employer's litigation costs will no
doubt increase. Particularly in this "decade of downsizing," reductions in force
("RIFs") as well as more individualized downsizing can create protracted and ex-
pensive litigation under the ADA, Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Tide VII), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e. See Kevin G. Salwen, Decade of Downsizing Eases Stigma of Layoffs,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1994, at BI (discussing trend of corporate downsizing).
Although RIFs have largely been subject to challenge under the ADEA and the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA"), RIFs are also subject to chal-
lenge under the ADA and other statutes. See Amy Karff Halevy & W. Jackson Wis-
dom, Managing a Reduction in Force: A Primer for the Corporate Counse4 Hous. LAw.
Oct. 1994 at 21 (stating that RIFs "can be a catalyst for costly and complex litiga-
tion under a variety of federal and state employment statutes").
Although overt discriminatory motives in RIFs are rarely apparent, employers
often give conflicting or inconsistent messages as to why a RIF or a more individu-
alized downsizing is being implemented. See id. at 25 ([The] "more objective the
626
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Some courts, realizing that a broad interpretation of the "re-
garded as" prong might include any employee whose employer had
any knowledge of an employee's medical condition, have taken a
narrow interpretation of disability under this prong.42 According
to these decisions, an employer must regard the impairment as sub-
stantially limiting a major life activity.43 In other words, it is not
criteria for selection, the stronger the company's position will be if the RIF is le-
gally challenged."). Faced with these inconsistent, but most likely nondiscrimina-
tory reasons, employees that belong to a protected class often seek relief through
litigation. Increasing the protected class of individuals under the ADA, therefore,
can only serve to increase the already burdensome costs of litigation.
For example, if an employee can satisfy the prima facie case under the ADA,
summary judgment in favor of the employer may be difficult to obtain. See, e.g.,
Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that summary judg-
ment is often inappropriate in employment discrimination cases); Hairston v.
Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that summary
judgment is "generally unsuitable in Title VII cases in which the plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case"); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir.
1985) (concluding that summary judgment is inappropriate once prima facie case
has been established). Even where more than the prima facie case is required to
survive summary judgment, "any defendant seeking summary judgment in a well-
prepared discrimination case will face a significant hurdle." Honorable Joseph E.
Irenas, Summary Judgment In Disparate Treatment Discrimination Cases: The View From
the Third Circuit, A.L.I., Feb. 1996, at 993.
If summary judgment is not obtained, however, litigation costs only increase.
See Darrell S. Gay, The Importance of Summary Judgment in Defending Civil Rights Cases,
at 65, 69 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 542, 1996)
("Motions for summary judgment can end litigation or sharply curtail its scope. In
either case, such motions may dramatically reduce litigation costs.., assist in eval-
uating claims and defenses, analyzing the admissibility of evidence and framing
legal arguments."). Not surprisingly, some employers are hesitant to litigate to the
completion of a trial and, therefore, settle as many claims as possible.
42. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1445 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that employer airline did not regard employee as disabled when it
disallowed employee from taxiing aircraft because of vision problems because taxi-
ing aircraft is single particular job); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir.
1996) ("[W]e hold that the mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee's
impairment is insufficient to demonstrate either that the employer regarded the
employee as disabled or that perception caused the adverse employment action.");
Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that employer did
not regard employee as substantially limited in major life activity under same stan-
dard); Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg., 926 F. Supp. 799, 806 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (re-
jecting plaintiffs allegations that defendant regarded him as having impairment
under ADA, stating, "the employer does not 'regard the employee as disabled sim-
ply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a
particular job'" (quoting Marshand v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 876 F. Supp. 1528,
1540-41, (N.D. Ind. 1995))); see also Partlow v. Runyon, 826 F. Supp. 40, 44 (D.N.H.
1993) (stating that test to determine "regarded as" "is whether the impairment, as
perceived, would affect the individual's ability to find work across the spectrum of
same or similar jobs").
43. See, e.g., Day v. Excel Corp., No. 94-1439-JTM, 1996 WL 294341, at *2 (D.
Kan. May 17, 1996) ("[R]egardless of whether the impairment actually exists, ex-
isted historically, or exists by reputation, the plaintiff still must demonstrate the
impairment substantially restricts a major life activity."). Thus, where an employer
does not believe the genetic information or potential future condition as presently
1997]
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enough that an employer knows, or even acts, on the basis of an
individual's impairment if the employer believes that the employee
is presently able to perform major life activities (such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speak-
ing, breathing, learning and working) .44 The reasoning employed
in these decisions may be extended to encompass situations where
the employer knows about a person's genetic abnormality, but per-
ceives the individual as presently capable of performing his or herjob.
A discussion of these cases illustrates the possible analogy. For
example, in MacDonald v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,45 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the employer's
knowledge of the plaintiff's impairment did not prove that the em-
ployer regarded the employee as disabled. 46 The plaintiff, Lennon
MacDonald, was terminated from his position as an aircraft
mechanic for Delta Airlines.47 MacDonald alleged that Delta per-
ceived him as disabled because his impaired vision prevented him
from performing his job as an aircraft mechanic. 4  The district
court rejected the plaintiffs claim of disability discrimination, find-
ing that he was unable to meet the threshold requirement of mem-
bership in the protected class. 4
9
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 50
First, the court reviewed the requirements of a "regarded as" claim
under the ADA.5 ' The court explained that Delta had to regard the
substantially limiting, an employer can take action based on such information and
not be regarding the employee as disabled.
44. See MacDonald, 94 F.3d at 1440 (holding that plaintiff failed to establish
prima facie case under ADA even though employer was aware of his impairment).
45. 94 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1996).
46. See id. at 1445.
47. See id. at 1440 (noting that plaintiff was forced to resign on July 23, 1993).
The plaintiff alleged that he was forced to resign in violation of the ADA and the
ADEA. See id. (noting that plaintiff filed ADA and ADEA charges against
defendant).
48. See id. at 1444 (noting that plaintiff argued that he met requirements
under ADA because Delta regarded him as substantially limited in his ability to
perform job of airplane mechanic, which qualified as "a class of jobs").
49. See MacDonald v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 95-4108, 1995 WL 674951, at *4
(D. Utah June 2, 1995) ("An impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an
individual's ability to perform only one job is not a disability under the ADA.").
50. See MacDonald, 94 F.3d at 1440 ("Because Mr. MacDonald has failed to
establish a prima facie case under either act, meaning that no reasonable jury
could return a verdict in his favor, we uphold the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendants on both claims.").
51. See id. at 1443-44 ("[W]e must define three terms that, by reference to
§ 12102(2) (A) [first prong of disability definition], are included in the definition
[of regarded as disabled]: 'regarded as,' 'major life activities,' and 'substantially
limits.'").
[Vol. 42: p. 613
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plaintiff as substantially limited in a major life activity because of his
impaired vision.52 Because MacDonald claimed that Delta re-
garded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of work-
ing, the court examined the regulations with respect to proving a
substantial limitation in one's ability to work.53 The court stated
that to succeed under this prong, the plaintiff was required to show
that Delta regarded the plaintiff as being substantially limited from
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.54
Reviewing the plaintiffs evidence, the court found that the plaintiff
could not show that Delta regarded his vision problems as substan-
tially limiting his ability to be an airplane mechanic. 55 Assuming
that Delta knew about the plaintiffs eye problems, the court ob-
served that Delta restricted the plaintiff only from taxiing air-
crafts.56 Despite this restriction, the court explained that taxiing
aircraft "is neither 'a class of jobs,' nor 'a broad range of jobs in
various classes,' but is instead 'a single particular job.'"57 Thus, ab-
sent a finding that the employer actually perceived the plaintiff as
substantially limited as a result of the medical condition, proof of
knowledge of its existence was insufficient to survive summary
judgment.
Similarly, in Kelly v. Drexel University,58 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit also addressed the significance of
an employer's knowledge of an employee's medical condition. The
plaintiff, Francis Kelly, suffered from a degenerative joint disease of
the right hip that caused him to have a noticeable limp.59 After his
diagnosis, Kelly's position at Drexel was eliminated, and he was
fired.60 After his termination, the plaintiff sued Drexel, alleging
that his termination violated the ADA.61
52. See id. at 1444 ("The ADA's implementing regulations define 'major life
activities' as 'functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and wm*ing.'") (emphasis
added).
53. See id. (noting that plaintiff only alleged working as major life activity in-
volved in suit).
54. See id. at 1444-45 (citing Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1104 (1995)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1997).
55. See id. (noting that plaintiff admitted that passing taxi physical was not
necessary part of his job as aircraft mechanic).
56. See id. ("[T]axiing aircraft is neither 'a class ofjobs,' nor 'a broad range of
jobs in various classes,' but is instead 'a single, particular job.'").
57. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j) (3) (i)).
58. 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996).
59. See id. at 103.
60. See id.
61. See id. (noting that plaintiff brought claims under ADA, ADEA and Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act).
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One of his claims against Drexel rested upon a perceived disa-
bility theory.62 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he satisfied the
first prong of the perceived disability definition because Drexel re-
garded his limp as a substantial limitation on his ability to walk. 63
As-evidence of the employer's perception, the plaintiff argued that
his supervisor knew about his hip problem and that the limp was
"visible and apparent."64 The court rejected the plaintiffs argu-
ments and affirmed the district court's order granting summary
judgment to Drexel.65 The court explained that, "the mere fact
that an employer is aware of an employee's impairment is insuffi-
cient to demonstrate either that the employer regarded the em-
ployee as disabled or that perception caused the adverse
employment action. '66
Given that these cases require a plaintiff to prove that the em-
ployer used its knowledge to regard the plaintiff as having an im-
pairment that substantially limited a major life activity, it follows
that the employer must regard them as disabled presently and not
sometime in the future.67 Nevertheless, several decisions, as well as
the Interpretive Guidance on this issue, support the conclusion that
an employer's concerns for an employee's future productivity, future
62. See id. at 109 (noting that plaintiff pursued actual disability claim and per-
ceived disability claim). The plaintiff's actual disability claim failed because the
court could not find that the plaintiff s limp substantially limited his ability to walk.
See id. Nevertheless, the plaintiff could still make out a perceived disability claim,
provided that the employer perceived the plaintiff's limp as a substantial limitation
on his ability to walk. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1)).
63. See id. at 108 ("Our analysis of this claim [of perceived disability] focuses
not on Kelly and his actual abilities, but rather on the reactions and perceptions of
the persons interacting or working with him."). The plaintiff did not allege that
the other two prongs of the perceived disability definition were applicable. See id.
at 108 n.6.
64. Id. at 109.
65. See id. ('Overall, we are satisfied that Kelly is not disabled within ADA on
either basis that he advances on this appeal.").
66. Id. The court explained:
If we held otherwise, then by a parity of reasoning, a person in a group
protected from adverse employment actions[,] i.e., anyone, could estab-
lish a prima facie discrimination case merely by demonstrating some ad-
verse action against the individual and that the employer was aware that
the employee's characteristic placed him or her in the [protected] group,
e.g., race, age, or sex.
Id.
67. For example, this conclusion follows from the fact that the court in Kelly
looked to the nature of the plaintiff's condition at the time he was terminated,
rather than the fact that the disease was degenerative in nature. See id. at 108-09
(citing employer's affidavit stating that employer did not perceive plaintiff's im-
pairment as disabling). Nevertheless, the plaintiff did not raise his future
problems as the basis for his "regarded as" claim under the ADA. See id. at 106
(describing plaintiffs present limitations in walking).
[Vol. 42: p. 613
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increased insurance costs and future attendance implicate the "re-
garded as" prong of the ADA.68
For example, at least one court has held that an employee is
disabled under the "regarded as" prong where an employer is con-
cerned about an employee's future productivity because of a sickle
cell condition. 69 In addition, courts have held that the possibility of
future increased insurance costs because of an employee's long-term
illness creates standing to sue under the "regarded as" prong of the
ADA. 70
Although these cases and the Interpretive Guidance lend sup-
port to the argument that the ADA should protect individuals
whose employers take their future health, productivity and insur-
ance costs into account, one should question whether this interpre-
tation of the ADA improperly extends the ADA's protection to
those who are already provided adequate protection under other
statutes. 71 For example, the recent passage of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act 72 [hereinafter "Portability Act"]
makes the potential for employer discrimination in the area of ge-
68. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 22, 6884 (stating that employer is
deemed to have regarded individual as disabled when employer discharges asymp-
tomatic employee with known genetic condition because of "concerns about mat-
ters such as ... productivity, insurance costs, and attendance").
69. SeeJones v. Inter-County Imaging Ctrs., 889 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). In Jones, plaintiff alleged he was terminated by his employer, the defendant,
because his employer believed that his sickle cell disease would adversely affect his
future attendance. See id. at 742. Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.
After deciding to treat the motion as one for summary judgment, the court denied
it, holding that plaintiff had stated a valid claim. See id. at 744.
70. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 769 (E.D.
Tex. 1996) (finding that employer violated ADA when, in effort to decrease ex-
penses, it changed group health providers to insurer that would never consider
covering one of employees in group because of that employee's disability); Jones,
889 F. Supp at 744 (holding that plaintiff stated valid claim when he alleged that
his employer terminated him because it wished to avoid additional medical insur-
ance costs associated with his sickle cell disease); Niemiec v. H & K Inc., No. 94-C-
553, 1995 WL 465683, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 26, 1995) (noting that terminating
employee to avoid presumed potential for large insurance costs associated with
employee's disabled child would be unlawful discrimination); Sawinski v. Bill Cur-
rie Ford, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (finding that plaintiff
stated valid claim of discrimination when he alleged that defendant terminated
him because of impact of his disability on defendant's cost of employee health
insurance).
71. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). This legislation protects employees and pro-
hibits insurers, including those employers who are self-insured, from discriminat-
ing against individuals and beneficiaries based on health status, particularly with
use of genetic information. For a further discussion of the Health Insurance Port-
ability Act of 1996, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
72. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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netic information less of a threat.73 Under the legislation, insur-
ance companies, as well as employers that self-insure, cannot make
insurance decisions based on an employee's genetic information.
The Portability Act prohibits insurance companies and those em-
ployers that self-insure from using genetic information as a preexist-
ing condition, absent a diagnosis of a condition relating to the
genetic condition.74 In addition, the Portability Act prohibits dis-
crimination against individual participants and beneficiaries based
on health status, particularly based on genetic information. 75 If an
employer were to discriminate against an asymptomatic individual
with a genetic disorder, the reason presumably would be because of
insurance costs. Now, because an insurance company or a self-in-
sured cannot take this information into consideration, the threat of
subsequent discrimination by an employer is largely eviscerated.
In addition, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") 76 also affords protection to those with genetic abnormal-
ities by prohibiting intentional discrimination or interference with
an employee's benefits. 77 In particular, if an individual with genetic
information was terminated or subjected to an adverse employment
action to deprive the individual of future employment benefits, that
individual would have a cognizable claim under section 510 of ER-
ISA.78 Given that section 510 of ERISA is designed to redress the
precise type of discrimination that individuals with genetic informa-
tion are likely to face, it does not make sense to afford duplicative
recovery by expanding the number of protected individuals cov-
ered by the ADA exponentially.
73. See id.
74. See id. § 706(b)(1)(B).
75. See id. § 706(a)(1)(F).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
77. See id. §§ 510, 1140. Section 510 of ERISA provides: "It shall be unlawful
for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the
plan." Id. § 510.
78. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wells Aluminum Corp., No. 95-2003, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2331, at *19 n.5 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1997) (noting that diabetic plaintiff could
have brought suit under section 510 of ERISA); Salus v. GTE Directories Serv.
Corp., 104 F.3d 131, 139 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's holding that
plaintiff who suffered from stress-related headaches was discharged in violation of
section 510 of ERISA); Godfrey v. Bell South Comm., Inc., 89 F.3d 755, 758 (11th
Cir. 1996) (holding employer's action of discharging employee because of her
child's hydrocephalus violated ERISA).
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V. CONCLUSION
The ADA was designed to protect a "discrete and insular mi-
nority," who "as a group... are severely disadvantaged socially, vo-
cationally, economically and educationally."79 Not every person
who ultimately learns about his or her genetic makeup, however, is
"severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally . . . and economi-
cally." 80 Most people who learn of their genetic makeup, even if a
potential abnormality exists, will have no problem working or per-
forming any other major life activity within their lifetime. In addi-
tion, given that many more people are likely to inquire into their
genetic makeup in the future, it seems the ADA should not be ex-
panded to extend protection to every individual who believes that
his or her employer acted on such information. Obviously, there
will be situations where employers will wrongly discriminate against
individuals on the basis of their genetic predisposition to disease.
Fortunately, other federal statutes redress this type of discrimina-
tion. 81 For this reason, and given that caution should be taken
before unduly expanding the scope of the ADA, courts should re-
frain from interpreting the ADA to afford protection to those indi-
viduals who either have potential future impairments or mere
knowledge of their genetic makeup.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6)-(7) (1994).
80. Id.
81. For a discussion of section 510 of ERISA, see supra notes 76-78 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the Health Insurance and Accountability Act of
1996, see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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